\u3ci\u3eWhren\u3c/i\u3e\u27s Flawed Assumptions Regarding Race, History, and Unconscious Bias by Carter, William M., Jr.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 66 | Issue 4
2016
Whren's Flawed Assumptions Regarding Race,
History, and Unconscious Bias
William M. Carter Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
William M. Carter Jr., Whren's Flawed Assumptions Regarding Race, History, and Unconscious Bias, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 947 (2016)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol66/iss4/6
Whren's Flawed Assumptions Regarding Race, History, and Unconscious
Bias
Erratum
Page 947, footnote *, line 3. For "2016" read "2015."
This symposium is available in Case Western Reserve Law Review: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol66/iss4/6
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016 
947 
Whren’s Flawed Assumptions 
Regarding Race, History, and 
Unconscious Bias 
William M. Carter, Jr.† 
My heartfelt thanks to CWRU Law School and the Law Review for 
having me here. I am an alumnus of CWRU Law, a former faculty 
member here from 2001–07, and a native Clevelander, so it’s always 
nice to be back home. 
This symposium marks the 20th anniversary of Whren,1 which hap-
pens to coincide with the 20th anniversary of my first year of law school 
here in this building. Shortly before I entered law school in the spring 
of 1995, Adarand v. Pena2 was decided. I had come to law school with 
very idealistic notions about race, social justice, and criminal law: it’s 
fair to say that Adarand and Whren bracketing my 1L year was a dash 
of cold water about the law’s—and the Court’s—willingness to grapple 
with persistent racial inequality in a forthright or effective manner. 
My 1L year here began with, on the one hand, Adarand, which by 
applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action devalued the existence of 
structural inequalities that might permit the government to intervene 
in order to create a level playing field.3 On the other hand, at the end 
of my first year of law school, the Whren decision was issued, which, 
by allowing pretextual searches and seizures even if racially motivated, 
devalued the lived experiences of people of color and gave license to 
racial profiling, at least as far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned.4 
 
  The following is adapted from the Whren at Twenty Symposium Panel IV: 
Alternative Routes, New Solutions, and New Definitions of the Problem 
on October 23, 2016, at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
†  William M. Carter, Jr. is Dean and Professor of Law at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law. Dean Carter received his J.D., magna cum laude 
and Order of the Coif, from the Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. Upon graduation from law school, he worked as a litigation associate 
in the Washington, D.C. offices of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and Ropes 
& Gray. From 2001-2007, Dean Carter was a Professor of Law at the Case 
Western Reserve University Law School. From 2007-2012, Dean Carter was 
a Professor of Law at the Temple University Beasley School of Law. 
1. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
2. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Adarand was argued on January 17, 1995 and decided 
June 12, 1995. Id. at 200. 
3. Id. at 227. 
4. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 819 (holding that “probable cause to believe that 
petitioners had violated the traffic code” justified a stop, even if the actual 
reason for the stop was based on the driver’s race). 
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Thus, in addition to being an important jurisprudential anniversary, 
the Whren decision is also an intellectual anniversary for me personally 
as I reflect upon how the decision shaped my view of these issues both 
as a practitioner and then subsequently as an academic. 
I want to talk very briefly about some of the flaws in Whren as a 
matter of constitutional history, doctrine, and social psychology. Those 
issues have been discussed throughout this symposium,5 so I will only 
touch upon them briefly. I will then discuss some legal developments in 
equal protection doctrine post-Whren. Finally, I will suggest a possible 
path forward. A great deal of my scholarship over the years has been 
in the field of the Thirteenth Amendment.6 I will, therefore, suggest 
that we can reconceptualize racially motivated, pretextual police en-
counters as a Thirteenth Amendment issue rather than as either a 
Fourth Amendment issue or a Fourteenth Amendment issue.  
First, as to Whren itself: it is very striking that there is not a single 
word in Whren specifically referencing the founding history or the 
Reconstruction Amendments’ Framers’ intent with regard to whether 
pretextual searches or seizures would have been considered “reason-
able.” To be sure, the Whren opinion relied largely upon its interpret-
ation of the Court’s earlier precedents; accordingly, the Court may not 
have found it necessary to engage in a lengthy historical exegesis in 
order to justify the result that it reached.7 Nonetheless, there is signifi-
cant reason to question whether the Framers and the Colonial citizenry 
that respectively wrote and ratified the original Constitution would 
have believed that the Fourth Amendment placed no restraints upon 
governmental officials’ ability to carry out roving searches and seizures 
based upon the merest pretext, given their own experiences with the 
colonial forces of the British Crown in this regard.8 Further, there is 
 
5. Lewis R. Katz, Introduction to Whren at Twenty: Systemic Racial Bias and 
the Criminal Justice System, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 923 (2016). 
6. See e.g., William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: 
Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1311 
(2007) [hereinafter Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment] (interpreting 
the meaning of badges and incidents of slavery); William M. Carter, Jr., The 
Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges and Incidents 
of Slavery, 71 Md. L. Rev. 21 (2011) (examining the scope of the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
7. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–19.  
8. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 
Mich. L. Rev. 547 (1999) (describing the Founders’ conceptions of the Fourth 
Amendment); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. 
L. Rev. 333, 333–38 (1998) (“white colonists rightfully protested that certain 
British search and seizure practices conferred ‘a power that places the liberty 
of every man in the hands of every petty officer’” (and noting the contradiction 
that many of these same colonists condoned equally arbitrary searches and 
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ample evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers specifically 
considered race-based pretextual searches and seizures to be violative 
of the “new birth of freedom”9 that the Reconstruction Amendments 
were designed to bring about, since such searches, seizures, and other 
restraints on blacks’ freedom of movement were key aspects of slavery 
and the legalized white supremacy that slavery both engendered and 
relied upon.10 
It is also worth noting how Whren fits within the Court’s broader 
equal protection doctrine regarding the role of motive in constitutional 
analysis. Whren holds that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordin-
ary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”11 Thus, under the 
Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Whren, subjective motive is irrele-
vant to the assessment of whether the government’s action is consti-
tutional. On the other hand, the Court’s equal protection doctrine has 
simultaneously placed increasing (indeed, determinative) emphasis on 
the relevance of motive in cases where plaintiffs have sought to advance 
the interests of racial minorities, such that proof of subjective discrimin-
atory motive is now the sine qua non of equal protection claims.12 Read 
 
seizures of blacks, both slave and free)). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994) (discussing 
Founders’ intent regarding the Fourth Amendment).  
9.  President Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).  
10.  See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (stating that the Thirteenth 
Amendment prohibited the “inseparable incidents of the institution” of 
slavery that were imposed upon blacks, such as “restraint of [their] move-
ments”). During the congressional debates regarding the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, its proponents similarly described state-imposed or state-sanctioned 
restraints on blacks’ freedom of movement as among the badges and incidents 
of slavery that the Amendment would abolish. Senator Lyman Trumbull of 
Illinois, for example, argued during the Thirteenth Amendment debates, that 
“[i]t is idle to say that a man is free who cannot go and come at pleasure.” 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1866), cited in Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 430 (1967). Senator Trumbull also noted, shortly 
after the Amendment was passed, that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished 
provisions of the states’ Black Codes that restrained African Americans’ 
freedom of movement. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866). 
11. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
12. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding that, absent proof 
of discriminatory purpose, even a substantial racially disparate impact “does 
not trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest 
scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations”) (citation 
omitted); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding, in a case alleging 
racial and religious discrimination, that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient 
factual specificity in his complaint regarding the defendant’s subjective state 
of mind to make his claim sufficiently “plausible” to survive a motion to 
dismiss). See also Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va. 
L. Rev. 951, 1013 (2002) (“Current doctrine requires plaintiffs challenging 
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together, the Court’s doctrine seems to be that the role of motive in 
constitutional analysis turns upon how it will affect the outcome. That 
is: if disallowing proof of motive means that claims advocating the in-
terests of racial minorities will fail, then proof of motive is deemed 
irrelevant;13 if requiring proof of motive means that claims advocating 
the interests of racial minorities will fail, then proof of motive is deemed 
required.14 A skeptical observer could conclude that that’s a doctrine of 
convenience rather than of principle.  
Moreover, Whren is particularly troubling in giving no attention to 
issues of social psychology, unconscious bias, and the historically groun-
ded implicit associations between race and widespread stereotypes re-
garding propensity for criminality.15 Combining the essentially unfetter-
ed discretion to conduct pretextual searches and seizures that Whren 
licenses with what we know about the history and psychology of the 
conflation of race and criminality, one is left to wonder: what did the 
Court think was going to happen post-Whren? The Court could not be 
surprised that Whren would predictably lead to an increase in racial 
profiling and increasing tension in police-community relations.16 To be 
clear, the problem is not necessarily that any individual law enforce-
ment officer consciously singles out people of color due to his or her 
personal animus against them. I do not assume that police officers are 
racist; I do believe, however, that in the absence of proactive training 
and interventions, they are no more immune to unconscious bias than 
the rest of us.  
To be sure, the Whren opinion gives a brief nod in the direction of 
these concerns in two lines that appear at the end of the opinion: “We 
of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective 
enforcement of the law based on consideration such as race. But the 
 
neutral laws or policies with a disparate impact to prove illicit motive . . . .”); 
Gordon G. Young, Justifying Motive Analysis in Judicial Review, 17 Wm. 
& Mary Bill Rts. J. 191 (2008) (discussing the use of motive, in part, in 
equal protection law).  
13. See, e.g., Whren, 517 U.S. 806. 
14. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662 (2009). 
15. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for 
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 17, 56-60 (2004) 
and authorities cited therein (discussing these issues in detail). 
16. See e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why 
“Driving While Black” Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999) (discussing 
the implications of racially motivated pretextual traffic stops); see also 
Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling 
and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 651 (2002) 
(discussing the use of racial profiling in stops and searches).  
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constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory appli-
cation of the laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Am-
endment.”17 Because Whren appeared to open the door to equal protect-
ion claims, litigants quickly began invoking the Equal Protection Clause 
in cases involving alleged racial profiling. Courts generally have not, 
however, been receptive to such claims post-Whren.18  
In United States v. Avery,19 for example, the defendant moved to 
suppress evidence of cocaine that was found in his carry-on luggage, 
arguing that he had been singled out for surveillance and subsequently 
searched because of his race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 
The officers testified at trial that Avery drew their attention for several 
reasons: he appeared to be very focused in trying to get to his seat on 
the plane; he appeared to be very anxious and in a hurry to board the 
airplane; he was the first passenger to get on the plane; and he had 
purchased a one-way ticket with cash shortly before departure.20 Avery 
was detained, and the police seized his carry-on bag, which was later 
found to contain cocaine.21 
 
17. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 
18. See e.g., Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that the 
plaintiff failed to prove discriminatory effect where she did not submit any 
statistical evidence of bias); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant because 
plaintiffs failed to prove the prime facie elements of an equal protection claim); 
United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997); Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 
245, 248–49 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant officer because the plaintiff could not point to evidence showing 
that the officer’s sole motivation in making the stop was the plaintiff’s race); 
United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 173–74 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Harvey, 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jennings, 985 F.2d 562 
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Taylor, 956 F.2d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating, in a pre-
Whren Fourth Amendment case, “[w]e would not hesitate to hold that a solely 
race-based suspicion of drug courier status would not pass constitutional muster. 
Accordingly, had [the officer] relied solely upon the fact of Weaver’s race as a 
basis for his suspicions, we would have a different case before us.” (emphasis 
added)); Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State H’way Patrol, 95 F. Supp. 2d 
723, 733–34 (N.D. Ohio 2000). But see Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. 
Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that city officials demonstrated deliberate 
indifference to equal protection violations) (remanded and reassigned for other 
reasons in Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118 (2013)); Giron v. City of 
Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Arkansas 2010) (holding that police officers 
intentionally and purposefully targeted Hispanic motorists in traffic stops in 
violation of equal protection). 
19. 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997). 
20. Id. at 346. 
21. Id. at 347. 
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At trial, one of the officers testified that Avery met several elements 
of a narcotics trafficking profile. Crucially, although the officer said he 
had never been formally taught to use race as an element of such a 
profile, he admitted on the stand that the understanding among officers 
was to look for black or Jamaican gang members who used young white 
women as drug couriers.22 In addition to this testimony regarding the 
influence of race on the officers’ decision-making, defendant Avery also 
presented statistical evidence that he argued raised an inference of a 
discriminatory motive in the decision to stop and search him.23  
Despite the explicit (and highly unusual) admission in open court 
that race influenced the officers’ decisions regarding who to stop and 
search and the statistical evidence of broader racial disparities, the 
Sixth Circuit nonetheless rejected Avery’s equal protection argument.24 
The court acknowledged Whren’s statement that claims of selective 
race-based law enforcement would trigger an equal protection (rather 
than Fourth Amendment) inquiry, and held that “[t]he Equal Protect-
ion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides citizens a degree of 
protection independent of the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”25 The Avery court further held, 
however, that in this context, the decision to investigate Mr. Avery was 
not based solely on racial considerations.26 Accordingly, under this “sole 
motive” standard, Avery’s claim failed.  
This “sole motive” standard, which has been cited favorably and 
applied by numerous other lower courts post-Avery in cases alleging 
racial profiling, is both nearly impossible to meet and represents an 
incorrect application of standard equal protection doctrine.27 As to the 
first point: in Avery itself, the court rejected the equal protection argu-
ment because the defendant could not prove that the only reason that 
 
22. Id. Note that if the officers were actually following the “informal” profile factor, 
it would have made little sense to search Mr. Avery: rather, they would have 
tended to search young white women (the most likely drug couriers in this 
context, according to the officer’s testimony), not black men.  
23.  Id. at 356. 
24. Id. at 358.  
25. Id. at 352. 
26. Id. at 358. 
27. See United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (“We have no 
need to reach [the question of whether the exclusionary rule applies to Four-
teenth Amendment violations] because the detectives in this case did not 
choose to interview the defendant solely because of her race.”). Brown v. City 
of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 1999) (“As the police therefore are 
not alleged to have investigated ‘based solely upon . . . race, without more,’ 
plaintiffs have failed to state an actionable claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”) (cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 44 (2001)). 
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he was stopped and searched was because of his race.28 There were mul-
tiple factors, one of which was explicitly racial.29 Despite the admitted 
fact that race infected the overall investigatory process, because Avery 
did not prove that race was the sole motive for this encounter, his equal 
protection challenge failed.30  
 As to the second point: The “sole motive” analysis is inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s “mixed-motive” analysis equal protection 
cases. The Court has squarely held that the Equal Protection Clause, 
while requiring proof of discriminatory motive in order to trigger strict 
scrutiny,31 “does not require a plaintiff to prove that the challenged 
action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes.”32 Thus, once 
race is found to be a substantial motivating factor, the burden shifts to 
the government to show that it would have made the same decision 
absent the racial factor.33 If it cannot make that showing, strict scrutiny 
is triggered and the government action would be presumptively uncon-
stitutional.34 The Avery court, and later courts that have applied the 
“sole motive” analysis in racial profiling cases, have, instead of applying 
the preceding analytical framework, simply found that race was not the 
sole motive for the search or seizure—which it would never be in a 
profiling case: a “profile” is by definition multifactoral—and that, there-
fore, the claimant loses.35 
 
28. Avery, 137 F.3d at 353–54, 358.  
29. See supra text accompanying notes 22–23 (describing the drug profile factors 
at issue in Avery). 
30. More specifically, the court held that Mr. Avery had not proven that racial 
considerations were the sole motive for the officers’ decision to investigate 
him. In other words, he did not foreclose the possibility that, despite officers’ 
admittedly applying the “informal” racial factor in stopping and searching 
other travelers, they may decided to stop and search him anyway for other, 
nonracial reasons. Avery, 137 F.3d at 347, 358.  
31. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
32. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977) 
(emphasis added). 
33. Id. at 270 n.21.  
34. Id. 
35. See U.S. v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 356–58 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that statistical 
evidence of disparate impact can be used only to create a “rebuttable, prima 
facie case” of race being a motivating factor, but finding Avery’s statistical 
evidence unpersuasive, particularly because the lower court found many 
reasons why Avery was stopped, independent of race; see also United States 
v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Avery in support of sole 
motive analysis); Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337–38 (2d Cir. 
1999) (same). 
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Whren’s promise of serious equal protection review of racially moti-
vated pretextual searches and seizures has therefore proved hollow. I 
have written elsewhere that a shift toward viewing racial profiling thr-
ough the different constitutional lens of the Thirteenth Amendment is, 
therefore, more likely to take account of the historical, sociological, and 
psychological factors that can lead to racial profiling.36 The following 
will show how the Thirteenth Amendment can address these issues in 
ways that the Fourth Amendment and the equal protection doctrine as 
currently construed do not.  
The Thirteenth Amendment textually speaks of forbidding slavery 
and involuntary servitude,37 but its Framers repeatedly expressed their 
intention that the Amendment would go further than abolishing unpaid 
labor.38 According to its Framers, the Thirteenth Amendment would 
also abolish “all badges and incidents of slavery”: those laws, customs, 
and lingering vestiges of slavery that were part of the slave power and 
that had supported it.39 Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, for ex-
ample, in speaking of the Amendment’s scope as authority for the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, stated:  
With the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the destruction 
of the incidents to slavery. When slavery was abolished, slave 
codes in its support were abolished also.  
Those laws that prevented the colored man going from home, that 
did not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did 
not allow him to own property; that did not allow him to enforce 
rights; that did not allow him to be educated, were all badges of 
servitude made in the interest of slavery and as a part of slavery. 
They never would have been thought of or enacted anywhere but 
for slavery, and when slavery falls they fall also.40  
In addition to listing such catalogs of the specific vestiges of the 
slave system, the Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers frequently spoke 
even more broadly about the Amendment’s purpose as destroying the 
entirety of the slave power’s legacy, wherever and in whatever form it 
was found to persist. Representative Myers of Pennsylvania, for ex-
ample, arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment provided congressional 
power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866, stated:   
36.  See Carter, supra note 34. 
37. U.S. Const. amend. XIII.  
38.  See Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1330–35 
(analyzing the Framers’ vision of the Thirteenth Amendment).  
39. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
40. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866). 
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The great change of which I have spoken is that from slavery to 
freedom. Slavery gone, its laws, its prejudices, and consequences 
should be buried forever. We are legislating for mankind. If there 
be wrong, now is the time to right it; if there be defects, this is 
the forum in which to remedy them; if doubts remain, the present 
is the hour to solve them. The craven may shift the responsibility, 
but civilization will hold us accountable for the performance of 
our whole duty.41 
I believe that racial profiling amounts to a badge or incident  
of slavery and that the Thirteenth Amendment therefore provides a 
constitutional remedy for it. There are at least three reasons for viewing 
race-based policing as a Thirteenth Amendment issue. 
First, in a very literal sense, such stops amount to a race-based 
restraint on freedom of movement. The widespread use of race-based 
pretextual searches and seizures results in significant limitations on the 
ability of persons of color to come and go as they please without state-
sanctioned limitations on their physical freedom of movement based 
(even in part) upon their race.42 
Second, in a broader sense, the historical association of blackness 
with criminality is, as noted earlier, part of the legacy of slavery and 
white supremacy that which we have all absorbed. To the extent that 
we give law enforcement officials wide discretion to utilize pretextual 
stops, those stops will be based upon hunches and intuition, which are 
in turn influenced by the centuries-long legacy of racial bias that they 
(and we all) have internalized.43 In determining when to utilize a pretex-
tual stop, officers must make judgments: as between the hundreds of 
citizens they encounter each day who commit nominal traffic infractions 
(which are impossible to avoid if one drives for any length of time) or 
quality of life offenses (e.g., littering), which ones to stop? The officer’s 
judgment will be informed by whom he or she believes is likely to be 
engaging in some additional more serious offense for which the traffic 
infraction or quality of life offense provides an investigative pretext, as 
is licensed by Whren. It is unlikely that law enforcement officials are 
immune from cultural biases that one’s status as a racial minority is 
 
41. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1622 (1866). See generally Race, Rights, 
and the Thirteenth Amendment, supra note 6 (discussing extensively the 
Amendment’s intent and purposes). 
42. Becca James, Stop and Frisk in 4 Cities: The Importance of Open Police 
Data, Sunlight Found. (Mar. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM) https://sunlightfoundation. 
com/blog/2015/03/02/stop-and-frisk-in-4-cities-the-importance-of-open-police- 
data-2/ [https://perma.cc/9Z3S-AG98] (noting stop and frisk data from four 
cities raises concerns that the stops are motivated by racial biases).  
43. See supra note 15 (citing articles about unconscious bias and associations 
between race and criminality).  
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probative of her propensity to engage in crime; thus, the officer’s intu-
ition regarding who to stop and search will be influenced by unconscious 
and implicit biases deriving from centuries of slavery and racial stereo-
typing. This sort of state-sanctioned stigmatization was considered by 
the Framers to be among the badges and incidents of slavery that the 
Thirteenth Amendment would abolish.  
The final benefit of a Thirteenth Amendment approach to the issues 
to which Whren gives short shrift is that the Thirteenth Amendment, 
by its very language and context, requires an understanding of and a 
candid jurisprudential dialogue about race, racism, and history. Thus, 
even if a particular claim based upon a badges and incidents of slavery 
theory ultimately proves unsuccessful, at least the claimant will have 
shaped the case in a way that is resonant with her lived experiences. 
Cases involving race-based pretextual stops are not just about abstract 
legal doctrine: they are, to the claimants and others similarly situated, 
just as much about the ability of persons of color to walk the streets 
and drive the roads of their country without wondering whether their 
ability to do so freely depends upon the color of their skin.  
 
